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[Abstract] 
This paper proposes a classroom-experiment approach to interrogate the specific 
factors model. Its design differs from earlier work in that students can observe both 
the factor prices in two different sectors, and the society’s welfare. Students 
participate as factor owners and can produce both of two kinds of goods by 
allocating their resources to maximise their teams’ welfare. Their resource 
endowment, relative prices, and trade rules vary round by round. Based on the 
outcomes, students discuss the impacts of relatively abundant resources, relative 
prices and trade rules on team welfare, individual income and the gains from trade. 
This classroom experiment could foster better learner understanding of the specific 
factors model, both individually and collectively. 
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1 Introduction 
In theory, international trade is mutually beneficial to the countries engaged in it. 
However, in the real world, governments commonly protect sectors of their 
countries’ economies from import competition, and trade also has substantial effects 
on income distribution within each trading nation, leading to its benefits often being 
distributed unevenly. Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2018) articulated two main 
reasons for international trade’s strong effects on the income distribution: inmobile 
resources among industriesand different production requirements among industries. 
These reasons cause the factor owners may gain and loss from trade.  
Following Ricardo (1891) and Viner (1932), the well-known specific factors 
model, as extended by by Samuelson (1971) and Jones (1971), was developed to 
deepen our understanding of international trade and trade policies. The trade effects 
are not only on a country as a whole, but on the distribution of income among 
production sectors. For example, Malki, Thompson, and Yeboah (2009) utilised it to 
predict the impact of Free Trade Area of the Americas on the textile and appearel 
industries in North Carolina, and found that it led to income redistribution across six 
labour skill groups, as well as generally higher wages due to rising product prices. 
Several similar models have since been developed from those of Jones and 
Samuelson: for example, by Bliss (2003), Melvin and Waschik (2001) and Dogan and 
Akay (2016).  
To illustrate the variants of the specific factors model in the classroom, Tohamy 
and Mixon (2003) employed ‘what-if’ questions within prepared spreadsheets that 
allowed students to look into the workings of the model and change its structure. As 
well as providing important advantages over ‘black-box’ presentations, this 
approach gave students an opportunity to practise their use of spreadsheet software. 
Similarly, Gilbert and Oladi (2011) Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, built in Excel 
software, combines a numerical description of the equilibrium with various common 
textbook geometric manipulations. This allows its users to instantly observe the 
impacts of modifications to the model’s parameters and exogenous variables, both 
numerically and graphically. The areas that can be observed in this way include 
specific factors, factor proportions, the general equilibrium of trade and industrial 
policy, trade disputes, and preferential trading agreements. 
Unlike these numerical simulations, the classroom-experiments approach allows 
students to experience the relationship of the production process to the trading 
system and to witness the precision with which economic theory predicted. As 
Oxoby (2001) suggested, this pedagogical tool provides a means of empirically 
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demonstrating abstract concepts; and when the related activities are thoroughly 
prepared, interaction amongst students can lead to a profound understanding of 
factor allocation, employment and income distribution. 
Dickie (2006), Kaplan and Balkenborg (2010), Emerson and English (2016) and 
Raboy (2017), among others, have suggested that classroom experiments increase 
learning motivation. In part, this may be because they allow students to put 
themselves in economic agents’ shoes, and thus not only gain a working 
understanding of economic concepts, but also learn to take economic decisions and 
evaluate the consequences. For instance, Yamarik (2018) classroom experiment that 
mimicked trade between the U.S. and Japanese automobile industries illustrated the 
gains from intra-industry trade, as well as how efficiency gains and economic 
recession can impact individual firms’ performance. 
The purpose of this study’s focal experiment is to provide students with a basic 
grounding in the specific factors model and its use. More specifically, it is designed 
to help students (1) understand how a mobile factor will respond to product price 
changes by moving across sectors; (2) explain why trade will generate both winners 
and losers in the short run; (3) see how differences in resources generate specific 
patterns of trade; and (4) comprehend the arguments in favour of free trade, despite 
the existence of losers. 
This approach is divided into two phases. In the first, without being informed 
about the specific factors model, students participate as factor owners and produce 
two kinds of goods by allocating their resources to maximise their respective teams’ 
welfare. Their resource endowment, the prices of the two goods, and trade rules vary 
in each of the four rounds. The second phase, based on the results of the first, 
provides a powerful illustration of the specific factors model via student discussion 
of the impacts of relative resource abundance, relative prices and trade rules on team 
welfare, individual income and gains from trade. In addition, engagement with one 
another in small groups equips the students, both individually and collectively, with 
a better understanding of the interaction between factor owners. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents its 
theoretical model and predictions; section 3, its experimental design and findings; 
and the final section, its conclusions. All experimental materials, include instructions, 
control questions, individual and group record sheets, and discussion questions, are 
provided in appendices section.  
2 The Model 
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2.1 In a Closed Economy 
In an economy with two products, goods 1 and 2, and three factors (H, S, and C), 
the allowances of the factors are ?̅?, 𝑆̅ and 𝐶̅, respectively. When addressing the 
issue of income distribution among the three factors, we assume that the two 
production functions have fixed proportions. The production functions of an 
economy’s production possibilities in a three-factor specific factors model can be 
described as: 
𝐺1(𝑆, 𝐻1) = min {
𝑆
3
, √2𝐻1}     (1) 
and  
𝐺2(𝐶, 𝐻2) = min {
𝐶
4
, √4𝐻2}     (2) 
where 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are respectively the production quantities of goods 1 and 2. The 
specific factors model assumes that one production factor (H) is mobile between 
sectors, while the two others (S and C) are sector-specific. The mobile factor 𝐻, 
𝐻 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2, is used to arrive at 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 respectively; S can only produce good 1; 
and C can only produce good 2. In prior studies, the mobile factor has usually been 
used to illustrate the labour movement between industries. 
2.1.1 Production possibilities 
Each country uses its resources to maximise production. The input cost (wages, 
or rent of inputs) is revenue divided by the amount of inputs. As we assume that H 
is perfectly mobile between industries, the factor owner’s income must be identical 
between industries. We simplified the model by assuming the factors are 
complements, so that production requires a fixed proportion of factors. This implies 
that the marginal rate of technical substitution of the mobile factor for the specific 
factor is either zero, or infinite. Thus, factors cannot be substituted for one another to 
maintain a constant output. 
To analyse the production possibilities of the economy, we need only to ask how 
its mix of outputs changes as the mobile factor is shifted from one sector to the other. 
Given sufficient specific factors, the slope of the production possibility frontier (PPF) 
defines the rate at which production of good 1 can be replaced by the production of 
good 2. The PPF function for the mobile factor allowance ?̅? is 
(𝐺1)
2
2
+
(𝐺2)
2
4
= ?̅?      (3) 
The slope of PPF is also known as the marginal rate of transformation (MRT = 2
𝐺1
𝐺2
). 
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If the specific factors are insufficient to complement production, the latter is 
constrained and the shape of PPF is knife-edged. 
For a specific factor supply, the resource allowances are 𝑆̅ and 𝐶̅ , and the 
resource allocations cannot exceed the allowances, which can be written as 
3𝐺1 ≤ 𝑆̅;   and 4𝐺2 ≤ 𝐶̅        (4) 
This implies that the marginal products of specific factors are constant, 𝑀𝑃𝑆 =
1
3
 
and 𝑀𝑃𝐶 =
1
4
. When the quantity of the mobile factor exceeds the requirement for it, 
an additional specific factor gives a constant return to the production. On the other 
hand, given a sufficient specific-factor supply, the marginal products of mobile factor 
H ( 𝑀𝑃𝐻1 =
𝜕𝐺1
𝜕𝐻1
=
1
√2𝐻1
 and 𝑀𝑃𝐻2 =
𝜕𝐺2
𝜕𝐻2
=
1
√𝐻2
) are diminishing returns in both 
sectors. 
2.1.2 Social welfare 
The social welfare of the economy is calculated as 
𝑊 = 𝐺1𝐺2       (5) 
The marginal rate of substitution (𝑀𝑅𝑆 =
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝐺1
⁄
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝐺2
⁄
=
𝐺2
𝐺1
) is the rate at which a consumer 
can give up some amount of one good in exchange for another good while 
maintaining the same level of welfare. In an autarkic economy, an efficient 
production combination exists when the MRS equals the MRT. If all the specific 
factors are present in sufficient quantity, the relationship between two products is 
2(𝐺1)
2 = (𝐺2)
2, and efficient production is achieved when the mobile resource is 
used completely. This further implies that the mobile resource is allocated equally to 
both sectors (𝐻1 = 𝐻2). 
2.1.3 Determination of relative prices 
In terms of production functions, an economy is economically efficient when its 
production possibility frontier is at a tangent to the relative price 
𝑃1
𝑃2
. It is intuitive 
that an increase in the relative price of 𝑃1 will move production from 𝐺1 to 𝐺2. As 
mentioned earlier, given a sufficient quantity of the specific factors, products’ 
negative relative prices will equal the MRS; and thus, 
𝑃1
𝑃2
=
𝐺1
𝐺2
. And when the mobile 
factor is allocated equally across two sectors, relative prices will be 
𝑃1
𝑃2
= √
1
2
. The 
price of 𝐺1 is cheaper than that of 𝐺2. Thus, once can intuit that, at any given level 
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of mobile factor, the production of good 1 will be more than that of good 2. 
2.1.4 Factor prices and income distribution 
Now we turn to a consideration of factor prices, which could represent either the 
rent of capital resources or wages paid to labour. The profit-maximising rule will 
drive the factor allocation up to the point where the value produced by an additional 
factor equals the cost of that factor. This means that the prices of S and C depend on 
the product prices 
1
3
𝑃1 and 
1
4
𝑃2, respectively. The owners of those specific factors 
face a fixed return for additional input, and their incomes are 
1
3
𝑃1𝑆 and 
1
4
𝑃2𝐶 , 
respectively. 
The mobile factor’s owner, meanwhile, faces a diminishing return in both sectors. 
In good 1’s sector, the demand curve for the mobile factor describes the value of an 
additional 𝐻1, which is the marginal product of 𝐻1 multiplied by the price of one 
unit of 𝐺1, 𝑀𝑃𝐻1𝑃1. This sector achieves equilibrium when that value is equal to the 
factor price in both sectors. Therefore, 
𝑃1𝑀𝑃𝐻1 = 𝑃2𝑀𝑃𝐻2      (6) 
and the relationship between mobile resource allocation and relative prices is  
𝐻1
𝐻2
=
1
2
(
𝑃1
𝑃2
)
2
. Due to the diminishing return, the marginal product decreases as the 
quantity of factor increases. The factor owner will find that his or her factor’s price 
has risen, but not proportionately to the rise in 𝑃1. Thus, the real factor price of good 
1 falls, while the real factor price of good 2 rises. The values of the marginal product 
of the mobile factor across sectors will be equal, meaning that additional units of that 
factor create the same value in both sectors. This reflects information about the 
effects of price changes on resource owners’ income levels. The mobile factors’ 
owners’ total income is, 𝑃1√
𝐻1
2
+ 𝑃2√𝐻2, i.e., the aggregate income from the two 
sectors. Since the mobile factor is not tied to one sector or the other, the impact of 
changes in its price on factor owners is ambiguous, and depends on the society’s 
preference for the two goods. 
2.2 International Trade in the Specific Factors Model 
When international trade is taken into account, the market does not achieve 
equilibrium simply because the MRS equals the MRT. In other words, the relative 
price of a product does not depend on domestic production and consumption, but 
on an exogenous factor determined by relative supply and demand worldwide. Here, 
we denote the world prices for the two goods as 𝑃1
𝑤 and 𝑃2
𝑤, and calculate the the 
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world relative price as 𝑃1
𝑤/𝑃2
𝑤. The economy arrives at consumption equilibrium 
when the world relative price equals the MRS, 
𝑃1
𝑤
𝑃2
𝑤 =
𝐺2
𝐺1
, and at production 
equilibrium when the world relative price equals the MRS, 
𝑃1
𝑤
𝑃2
𝑤 = 2
𝐺1
′
𝐺2
′, with 𝐺1
′ and 
𝐺2
′  denoting the consumption of good 1 and good 2. 
If the world relative price is higher than the domestic relative price, 𝑃1/𝑃2, 
consumers in a given country will demand relatively more 𝐺2 than 𝐺1, and its 
economy will therefore export 𝐺1 and import 𝐺2. In other words, countries will 
export whichever good has a relative price below the world relative price. The world 
relative price may differ from the domestic price before trade for two reasons. First, 
as in the Ricardian model, countries differ in their production technologies; and 
second, countries differ in terms of their endowments of the factors specific to each 
industry. After trade commences, the domestic relative price will equal the world 
relative price; and as such, the relative price in the exporting sector will rise, and that 
in the sector competing with imports will fall, leading to an expansion of the former 
and a contraction of the latter. 
2.2.1 Income redistribution and the gains from trade 
To assess the effects of trade on a particular factor, we can look at how relative 
price changes translate into changes in income distribution. In a closed economy, the 
output of a product equals its consumption, and relative price is determined by 
domestic outputs. In an open economy, on the other hand, international trade makes 
it possible for the mix of products consumed to differ from the mix produced; and 
relative price is determined exogenously, i.e., by world supply and demand. 
Income-distribution effects arise for two reasons: firstly, that the specific factors 
cannot move from one sector to another; and secondly, that changes in a national 
economy’s production combination have differential effects on the demand for 
different production factors. It is reasonable to expect that differences in resource 
allowances will act as incentives to international trade, which in turn could affect 
products’ relative price. More specifically, we assume that in the sector whose 
relative price increases, the specific factor owner will gain, and that the other sector, 
the specific factor owner will lose. In other words, trade benefits the factor specific to 
the export sector, while harming the factor specific to the import sector; and its 
effects on the mobile factor remain ambiguous. 
3 Experiment Design 
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This experiment should be conducted in a classroom setting, and before it 
commences, students should read the instructions provided as Appendix 1, and 
answer the set of 14 control questions provided at the end of the instructions to test 
their understanding of the rules. However, to save time in class, this can be done as 
online homework. Play is designed to last for one hour, and once it ceases, a list of 
questions is provided for a further 30-minute discussion. Thus, the entire process can 
be completed in less than two hours. 
During play, all participants are organised into teams of three, representing 
factor owners in a country. Each team uses its own record sheet (see Appendix 2), 
and each student, a separate individual record sheet (Appendix 3). In each round, 
each player receives a card that represents his or her role as the owner of resource S, 
C or H. Every card is also marked with a number (either 1 or 2), which multiplied by 
15 is that resource’s allowance, i.e., either 15 or 30. The sizes of these resource 
allowances imply the relative abundance of the production factors. Following 
Deardorff (1982), each team/country is expected to export goods whose production is 
intensive in factors with which it is abundantly endowed. 
Each team works together to make two products by allocating their resources 
according to the production requirements set forth in the instructions. 
Disagreements about such allocations are resolved by a majority vote of the team 
members. Resources S and C are specific to 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 respectively, while resource 
H is used for both products. To simplify the procedure, production functions are set 
in fixed proportions, with no possibility of substituting one resource for another. 
In each of the game’s four rounds, participants are asked to produce by 
allocating their resources, with the goal of maximising their teams’ welfare which as 
noted above is arrived at by multiplication of two types of consumption. Importantly, 
the welfare function is diminishing: i.e., as consumption of one good increases, the 
team is more willing to forgo the consumption of another good to maintain the same 
welfare level. In the first two rounds, no trade is allowed, and consumption equals 
production. Thereafter, trade is allowed in fixed proportions: in round 3, players can 
exchange 2 units of good 2 for 1 unit of good 1, or vice versa; and in round 4, the 
exchange rate becomes 1 unit of good 2 for 2 units of good 1. Consumption is equal 
to the number of ex post trading products. 
After play ends, the students are given a few minutes to record the results on 
their individual sheets and to calculate prices and their individual incomes. In 
rounds 1 and 2, when no trade is allowed, the price of good 2 is set as the standard 
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and the price of good 1 is determined by it and by production levels. The individual 
incomes of specific factor owners rise as product prices increase and more resources 
are used. However, the individual incomes of mobile factor owners are ambiguous 
due to their resource being used in two sectors. 
The discussion questions regarding the results of play (provided as Appendix 4) 
firstly guide the students to consider how production changed due to different 
resource allowances and rules. Secondly, they prompt examination of the impact on 
the team’s welfare; and finally, they focus on income distribution and the gains from 
trade among resource owners in different sectors based on their resource allowances, 
individual incomes and relative product prices. 
4 Conclusion 
It is anticipated that this study’s proposed classroom experiment-based learning 
approach will achieve the goal in international trade education. Learning by playing 
an experiment could enhance students’ interests. The system of resource 
endowments, relative prices, and trade rules featured in this experiment can be 
replicated in an educational context to account for different international trading 
scenarios. The students’ work in small groups will allow them to experience the 
types of interaction that occur between factor owners in the economy. It will 
encourage students to think about the impacts of trade on productivity, income 
distribution and the gains from international trade. This classroom experiment could 
foster better learner understanding of the specific factors model, both individually 
and collectively. 
 
9 
 
Appendix 1. Instructions 
This game has four rounds. You will play in a team of three players, each of whom 
will be given one card. Each of the three card suits represents a different type of 
resources (♥𝐻,♠ 𝑆,♣ 𝐶). Your allowance (𝐻/ 𝑆/ 𝐶) is the card number times 15, i.e., 
either 15 or 30. 
* Inputs & Production * 
Within the allowance, you can allocate the inputs to produce two types of goods 
(good 1 and good 2) with your team mates. Production of one unit of good 1  
requires a combination of (the production level times half of the level, 𝐺1 × 𝐺1/2) 
units of ♥H (𝐻1) and 3 units of ♠S (S). The production of one unit of good 2 
requires a combination of (the production level times one-fourth of the level, 
𝐺2 × 𝐺2/4) units of ♥H (𝐻2) and 4 units of ♣C (C). Remember! The resources used 
must not exceed your allowance, and your production should be an integer. 
The following tables show production examples and their corresponding resource 
requirements. 
𝐺1 
Production 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
♥H (𝐻1) 
1
2
 2 4
1
2
 8 12
1
2
 18 24
1
2
 
♠S (S) 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 
 
𝐺2 
Production 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
♥H (𝐻2) 
1
4
 1 2
1
4
 4 6
1
4
 9 12
1
4
 
♣C (C) 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 
 
* Trade * 
In Rounds 1 and 2, you are not allowed to trade. In Rounds 3 and 4, you will be given 
the prices of the two goods, you will be allowed to trade both of them with the 
experimenter. The trading volume should be a non-negative integer. 
 In round 3, you can exchange two 𝐺1 for one 𝐺2, or vice versa. 
 In round 4, you can exchange one 𝐺1 for two 𝐺2, or vice versa. 
Your trading decisions must be agreed to by a majority of your team members, i.e., 
by at least two people. 
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* Team Welfare * 
The goal of each team is to achieve the highest welfare, computed using the formula 
(𝑊 = 𝐺1 × 𝐺2). In rounds 3 and 4, welfare is simply the post-trading quantities of 
products.  
Control Questions:  
Q1. How many cards will you get in each round?  (1 card per person or 3 per team) 
Q2. Can you exchange your cards with other players?  (No) 
Q3. Your goal in this game is to… (make your team welfare as high as possible) 
Q4. If your team allowance is 30♥, 15♠, and 15♣, can you produce 5 𝐺1 and 4 𝐺2?  
(No. Such production would require 16.5♥((=
52
2
+
42
4
), 15♠ and 20♣) 
Q5. If your team allowance is 30♥, 15♠, and 15♣, can you produce 4 𝐺1 and 3 𝐺2?  
(Yes. Such production requires 10.25♥(=
42
2
+
32
4
), 12♠ and 12♣) 
Q6. To produce 5 units of 𝐺1 and 5 units of 𝐺2, how many units of ♠ do you 
require?  (3 × 5 = 15) 
Q7. To produce 2 units of 𝐺1 and 4 units of 𝐺2, how many units of ♠ do you 
require?  (3 × 2 = 6) 
Q8. To produce 5 units of 𝐺1 and 3 units of 𝐺2, how many units of ♥ do you 
require?  (
52
2
+
32
4
= 14
3
4
) 
Q9. To produce 4 units of 𝐺1 and 3 units of 𝐺2, how many units of ♥ do you 
require?  (
1
2
× 42 +
1
4
× 32 = 10
1
4
) 
Q10. To produce 3 units of 𝐺1 and 5 units of 𝐺2, how many units of ♣ do you 
require?  (4 × 5 = 20) 
Q11. In rounds 1 and 2, what’s the team welfare for the production combination of 2 
𝐺1 and 3 𝐺2 ? (𝑊 = 2 × 3 = 6) 
Q12. In round 3, if you produce 2 𝐺1 and 3 𝐺2, can you have 4 𝐺1 after trading? 
(No, because you would have to give up 2 𝐺2 for each 1 𝐺1 that you received. Thus, 
to gain 2 additional 𝐺1, you would need to start with 4 𝐺2, not 3 𝐺2) 
Q13. In round 4, if you produce 2 𝐺1 and 3 𝐺2, can you have 4 𝐺1 after trading? 
(Yes. Because you can trade 2 𝐺1 for 1 𝐺2, you can gain 2 additional 𝐺1 by giving 
up 1 𝐺2) 
Q14. In round 4, if you produce 2 𝐺1 and 3 𝐺2, can you have 4 𝐺2 after trading? 
(Yes. Because you can trade 2 𝐺1 for 1 𝐺2, you can gain 1 additional 𝐺2 by giving 
up 2 𝐺1) 
 
11 
 
Appendix 2. Team Record Sheet     Team: __________ 
Name: ________________  Student ID: ______________________ 
Name: ________________  Student ID: ______________________ 
Name: ________________  Student ID: ______________________ 
Step 1. Please record your resource allowances 
Round ♥ 𝐻 ♠ 𝑆 ♣ 𝐶 
1 
   
2 
   
3 
   
4 
   
Step 2. Please decide your production (𝐺1 and 𝐺2) by allocating your resources 
 𝐺1  𝐺2  Team welfare 
Round 
Used 
Resource 
♥H1  
Used 
Resource 
♠S 
Output (𝐺1) 
Used 
Resource 
♥H2 
Used 
Resource 
♣ 𝐶 
Output (𝐺2) 𝑊 = 𝐺1 × 𝐺2  
1        
2        
3        
4        
Step 3. Trade to achieve higher welfare 
Round 
Sell  
(𝐺1 or 𝐺2) 
Buy 
(𝐺1 or 𝐺2) 
After-trade 
Good 1 (𝐺1′) 
After-trade 
Good 2 (𝐺2′) 
New Team Welfare  
𝑊′ = 𝐺1′𝐺2′ 
3  
    
4  
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Appendix 3. Individual Record Sheet 
Name: ________________  Student ID: ______________________ 
Step 1. Record your card suit, number and resources used 
Round Allowance (♥𝐻,♠ 𝑆,♣ 𝐶) Used resources (♥𝐻, ♠𝑆, ♣𝐶) 
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4   
 
Step 2. Record your production plan and calculate your individual income 
Round 
Good 1  
(𝐺1) 
Price 1 
(𝑃1 = 4
𝐺1
𝐺2
) 
Score (1) = 
𝑃1𝑆/3 or 
𝑃1
1
√2𝐻1
 
Good 2  
(𝐺2) 
Price 2 (𝑃2) 
Income (2)= 
𝑃2𝐶/4 or 
𝑃2
1
√𝐻2
 
1     4  
2     4  
3  8   4  
4  4   8  
* Price Determination * 
In rounds 1 and 2, the price of 𝐺2 is 𝑃2 = 4. The price of 𝐺1 is 𝑃1 = 4 (
𝐺1
𝐺2
). If 𝐺2 is 
zero, let 𝑃1 = 30. 
In round 3, the prices of 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are fixed as 8 and 4 respectively. In round 4, the 
prices of 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are 4 and 8 respectively. 
* Individual Income * 
Your individual income depends on the prices of the two goods and your resource 
use. If you hold card ♠𝑆 your income is 
1
3
𝑃1𝑆. If you hold card ♣𝐶, it is 
1
4
𝑃2𝐶; and 
if you hold card ♥H, your income is based on the production of goods 1 and 2, 
using the formula (𝑃1
1
√2𝐻1
+ 𝑃2
1
√𝐻2
).  
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Appendix 4. Post-experiment Discussion:  
1. The Hecksher-Ohlin theorem suggests that a country where a certain factor is 
abundant exports the good whose production depends intensively on that factor. 
Do you agree with this theorem? 
2. Did you trade in rounds 3 and 4? If not, why did you choose not to? Regardless of 
whether you traded, did your team’s welfare end up higher than in rounds 1 and 2? 
3. Do you feel that your trading plan was the same as other teams’? If not, what was 
different about it? 
 
Using the formulae below, please populate the table with the correct prices and your 
individual income. Please answer the following questions.  
Round Good 1 (𝐺1) 
Price 1 
(𝑃1 = 4 (
𝐺1
𝐺2
)) 
Product value 
(𝑃𝑉1=𝑃1 × 𝐺1) 
Good 2 (𝐺2) Price 2 (𝑃2) 
Product value 
(𝑃𝑉2=𝑃2 × 𝐺2) 
1     4  
2    
 
4  
3  8  
 
4  
4  4  
 
8  
 
4. Did you tend to trade goods whose production depended intensively on factors 
with which your team was abundantly endowed? Did your behaviour support or 
go against the Ricardian Theorem? 
5. Would a different relative price between goods have altered your production plan 
in rounds 3 and 4? Discuss the impact of the relative price change on income 
distribution, product value and the production plan. 
6. Considering your individual incomes, did the factor owners all gain from trade? If 
not, discuss why the gains from trade were not equally spread. 
7. In a non-trading scenario, could you devise a compensation plan for transferring 
income from a specific factor owner to another that would make everyone better off 
than they would be if they traded instead? 
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